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| “Resolution of the debate between President
Bush and his critics as to whether he knew Saddam Hussein had no weapons
of mass destruction prior to the 2003 invasion turn on the question: When
is a duck a duck? …A source outside the U. S. political system, close to Saddam while he was in power, has provided personal insight on the issue. What he shares is most revealing, providing an informed perspective to anyone interested in independently judging what reasonably was known. When the WMD investigation was initiated after Saddam’s fall, investigators received little cooperation from Iraqi government scientists most knowledgeable on the issue. Fear was a factor, as several scientists in a position to have known were found dead under suspicious circumstances. However, some officials were able to escape to less dangerous venues – as did the former head of Saddam’s nuclear centrifuge program, Mahdi Obeidi. In September 2004, Obeidi shared the following about Saddam’s WMD effort in a piece in the New York Times: |
| “Iraq’s nuclear weapons program was on the
threshold of success before the 1991 invasion of Kuwait – there is no
doubt in my mind that we could have produced dozens of nuclear weapons
within a fear years – but was stopped in its tracks by UN weapons
inspectors after the Persian Gulf war and was never restarted. During the
1990s, the inspectors discovered all the laboratories, machines and
materials we had used in the nuclear program, and all were destroyed or
otherwise incapacitated. By 1998, when Saddam Hussein evicted the weapons
inspectors from Iraq, all that was left was the dangerous knowledge of
hundreds of scientists and the blueprints and prototype parts for the
centrifuge, which I had buried under a tree in my garden. … “So, how could the West have made such a mistaken assessment of the nuclear program before the invasion last year?… First, there was Saddam Hussein’s history. He had demonstrated his desire for nuclear weapons since the late 1970s…He had used chemical weapons against his own people and again Iran in the 1980s. After the 1991 war, he had tried to hide his programs in weapons of mass destruction for as long as possible… It would have been hard not to suspect him of trying to develop such weapons again… “The West never understood the delusional nature of Saddam Hussein’s mind…[He lived in a] fantasy world…[He kept the country’s Atomic Energy Commission alive but] staffed [it] with junior scientists involved in research totally unrelated to nuclear weapons, just so he could maintain the illusion in his mind that he had a nuclear program. Sort of like the emperor with no clothes, he fooled himself into thinking that he was armed and dangerous.” |
| “Obeidi’s revelations raise an interesting
question: If Saddam acted as if he had WMDs because he believed, however
illogically, that he possessed them, how can we fault our own intelligence
agencies and the president from arriving at a similar conclusion? After
all, if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, one would not be
unreasonable in concluding it was a duck – even if such a conclusion later
turned out to be inaccurate. “The debate about what the president knew or did not know should have ended long ago on the basis of Obeidi’s personal insights of Saddam – a man who proved so capable of fooling the world that he even fooled himself.” [Marine Corps Times, Sept 12, 2005] |